INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE IN NEW
JERSEY: DUE PROCESS AND THE
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
JohnJ. Sarno*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1981, the New Jersey Legislature declared that the expansion of international trade and commerce was vital to the maintenance and continued growth of a healthy New Jersey economy.'
A decade later, the number of business failures in the state had
doubled and the dollar values of their liabilities had tripled from
1990 levels. 2 While the state's economy continues to be battered
by forces substantially outside of its control, many business people and economists believe that international commerce, especially with European and Mexican companies, holds important
long-term potential for American companies.3 Confronted with
diminished prospects at home, many New Jersey businesses are
exploring emerging global markets to generate profits.4
While businesses expect that participation in the global
economy will create viable new markets for their products and
services, the demands of international commerce will have a sub* Associate in the law firm of Robinson, St. John & Wayne, Newark, NewJersey.
J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A., Seton Hall University; B.A.,
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I N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27H-22.1 (West 1986).
2 John T. Harding, Business Failures Doubled in '91, THE STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 10,
1992, at 23.
3 Id.
4 Marian Courtney, Companies Prospecting in the New Europe, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23,

1992, at N.J. 1.
In 1992, the European Community is scheduled to complete the first stage of
its economic integration program. If ratified, the unification will result in creating

the world's second largest trading bloc, comprising over 325 million consumers.
Already, the European Community represents New Jersey's biggest trading part-

ner, and many hope that because of the state's geography and infrastructure, New
Jersey can become to Europe what California is to the Far East. See Europe in the
Nineties, Division of Commerce and Economic Development, State of New Jersey

(1990), at 2.
The world's largest trading bloc will be formed among Mexico, Canada and the
United States. The passage and implementation of the North American Free Trade
Agreement will create a market comprising 360 million consumers. John T. Harding, New Free Trade Pact Called Big Boost for Jersey Exports, THE STAR-LEDGER, Aug.
13, 1992, at 1. NewJersey firms are already planning to enter emerging markets in
Mexico. Id.
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stantial impact on how business is conducted and, ultimately, on
how commercial disputes are resolved. Traditional methods of
resolving disputes through litigation or arbitration will be altered
in the global marketplace, primarily because United States citizens are bound by treaties and conventions that may pose unforeseen hurdles to litigation and alternate dispute resolution.
While domestic companies are turning to foreign corporations
for new business opportunities, foreign nationals may be immune from suit in the United States when opportunities go sour.
Domestic companies may be compelled to engage in costly, timeconsuming global litigation to recoup losses, or even to forego
any meaningful opportunity to regain such losses, rather than to
sue a foreign corporation on its home turf. Alternatively, state
courts, particularly in NewJersey, are steadily increasing their jurisdictional reach over foreign corporations.
This Article will consider the constitutional implications of
the global economy, with particular emphasis on the expansion
of state jurisdiction over international disputes. It will discuss
the basis of state power to affect foreign commerce through the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations. It
will also discuss alternatives to international litigation and the
trend toward using international conventions and protocols to
resolve commercial disputes.
II.

INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORK

A.

The Basis of the State's Jurisdiction over InternationalCommerce

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the Congress shall regulate commerce among
the states and with foreign nations.5 Although Article One of the
Constitution contains language explicitly limiting state interference with foreign commerce,6 the Commerce Clause does not explicitly limit a state's ability to influence foreign commerce.
Thus, restrictions on state power have evolved from the Constitution's negative implications, and by interpreting "these great
silences of the Constitution."' 7 Although the Commerce Clause
does not explicitly limit a state's power to influence foreign com5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. This provision prohibits states from taxing imports
or exports "except what may be ... absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
7 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
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merce, congressional power in the area has been construed as all
but exclusive. For example, the Court has stated that "[i]t is an
essential attribute of the power that it is exclusive and plenary.
As an exclusive power, its exercise may not be limited, qualified
or impeded to any extent by state action. '"8
According to James Madison, the role of the national government was to keep the states from engaging in discriminatory,
self-protective and retaliatory conduct. 9 According to Madison,
without the Commerce Clause "the great and essential power of
regulating foreign commerce would have been incompleat, and
ineffectual." 1 Thus, the sweep of the national government's
power to regulate commerce turned on the states' voluntary relinquishment of their sovereignty when they ratified the Constitution. " Observers have noted that the Commerce Clause forms
12
the charter of the greatest economy in the world.
It is clear that if the sweep of the Commerce Clause can prohibit a family farmer from growing a few bushels of wheat for his
own use, 13 it seems likely that a state court would likewise be
barred from exercising its jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
But, while the Commerce Clause abolished trade barriers erected
by the states:
the Framers also intended that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of
each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of
all of its sister States - a limitation express or implicit in both
the original scheme of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton explained that the Constitution
created concurrent jurisdiction between state and federal courts,
but only over "those descriptions of causes of which the State courts
have previous cognizance."' 5 Hamilton declared that:
[t]he judiciary power of every government looks beyond its
own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all
8 Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56-57
(1933) (citations omitted).
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 422 (James Madison).
10 Id.

I' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1924).
12

See generally CHARLES A.

BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTI-

(1935).
See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
14 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
15 THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton).

TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
13
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subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction,
though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the
most distant part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than
of New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our
courts. When in addition to this we consider the State governments and the national governments, as they truly are, in the
light of kindred systems, and as parts of one whole, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts would have
a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of
the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited. 6
Consequently, New Jersey businesses have traditionally relied
upon the state's "long arm rule"' 7 to bring recalcitrant nonresidents into court to resolve commercial disputes.' 8 Even though
"the great and essential power" 9 of the Commerce Clause would
otherwise bar a state's act that would interfere with international
commerce, the Constitution does not prevent a citizen from invoking the state court's jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. This
apparent contradiction establishes the foundation of the federalist
system created by the Constitution: co-equal sovereigns exercising
concurrent jurisdiction over, among other things, commercial disputes. Although a foreign corporation may be brought into New
Jersey to answer allegations of wrongdoing, the power of the legal
process is not without limitations. The Constitution, which allows
the states to retain concurrent jurisdiction over matters that affect
foreign commerce, also restricts the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Additionally, treaties, like the Constitution, enjoy the status of constituting the law of the land20 and may pose additional restrictions
on the states.
B.

The Diminishing Due Process Guarantee

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that no state
shall deprive any person of a liberty interest without due process
of law. 2 ' The Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty
interest in that an individual is not subject to the judgments of a
court that lacks jurisdiction.2 2 Although this protection operates
to restrict state power, the United State Supreme Court has
16
17
18

A.2d
19
20
21
22

Id.
N.J. CT. R. 4:4-4(c)(1).
Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 469, 508
1127, 1131 (1986).
THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1985).
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noted that such restriction is "ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause
[rather than a function] of federalism concerns.2 3 Thus, while
New Jersey courts are vested with jurisdiction over foreign corporations "to the uttermost limits permitted by the United States
Constitution, ' 24 due process requires that the exercise of jurisdiction comport with "traditional notions of fair play and sub25
stantial justice.
Such notions have evolved over time, following the realities
of the marketplace. In the 1878 case of Pennoyer v. Neff,2 6 the
Supreme Court construed the Due Process Clause as requiring
the personal presence of the defendant in the jurisdiction. Almost seventy years later, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,27
the Court recognized that the requirement of a corporate presence did not comport with the realities of interstate commerce.
In its famous statement of the minimum contacts doctrine, the
Court determined:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. "28
While fair play and substantial justice may require that a foreign
corporation have some minimal presence in a state before the corporation is forced to defend itself in court, the Supreme Court nevertheless observed in the 1957 case of McGee v. InternationalLife Ins.
29
Co.
that "a trend is clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
other nonresidents."" ° The McGee Court further noted:
[TIhis [trend] is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many
commercial transactions touch two or more states and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this in23 Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982).
24 Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 NJ. 264, 268, 277 A.2d 207, 209 (1971).
25 Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 469, 508
A.2d 1127, 1131-32 (1986) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
26
27
28
29
30

95 U.S. 714 (1878).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id. at 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
355 U.S. 220 (1957).

Id. at 222.
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creasing nationalization of commerce has come a great
increase in the amount of business conducted by mail across
state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party
sued to defend3 himself in a State where he engages in economic activity. '
Moreover, as the New Jersey Supreme Court observed, " [w]ith
the metamorphosis from a national to an international economy, the
expansion of state jurisdiction has special relevance for foreign corporations engaged in commercial activities throughout the United
States."3 2 Predictably, the internationalization of the marketplace
has contributed to the diminution of individual liberty, thus making
it easier to be sued in a distant forum, 3 and increasing the states'
jurisdiction over foreign commerce. This development has caused
some concern that foreign companies will refrain from conducting
business in the United States. 4
C.

Safeguarding InternationalCommerce
1.

Balancing Commercial Considerations

In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 5 the
Supreme Court seemingly restricted the ability of a United States
citizen to sue a foreign corporation in a state court despite the
defendant corporation's substantial contacts with the forum
state. In Helicopteros, the survivors and representatives of four decedents killed in a helicopter crash in Peru filed suit in Texas.
The decedents were employed by a Texas joint venture that
purchased the helicopter from a Columbian corporation. The
negotiations, as well as the flight training, took place in Texas.
The Court found that these contacts collectively were insufficient
to justify the state court's jurisdiction over the Columbian corporation. 3 6 In short, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion determined that "purchases and related trips, standing alone, are not
3 7
a sufficient basis for a State's assertion of jurisdiction.
Id. at 222-23.
Charles Gendler, 102 N.J. at 474, 508 A.2d at 1134.
33 Id. at 478-79, 508 A.2d at 1136-37.
34 See Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 425 n.3
(1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (examining the Solicitor General's assertion that
foreign companies, fearing exposure to general jurisdiction on extraneous causes
of action, may refrain from buying in the United States).
35 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
36 Id. at 415-17.
31

32

37

Id. at 417.
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In dissent, Justice Brennan advocated the expansion of state
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. 8 Striking a balance between commercial benefits and legal obligations, the dissent
explained:
As active participants in interstate and foreign commerce take
advantage of the economic benefits and opportunities offered
by various States, it is only fair and reasonable to subject them
to the obligations that may be imposed by those jurisdictions.
And chief among the obligations that a nonresident corporation should expect to fulfill is amenability to suit in any forum
that is significantly affected by the corporation's commercial
activities.3 9
Although Justice Brennan intended his flexible approach to the
Fourteenth Amendment to accommodate the realities of a global
market, the Helicopteros majority noted that the Due Process Clause
continued to curb the expansion of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. 40 In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 4i Justice Brennan
wrote for the majority and declared that "the Due Process Clause
allows flexibility in ensuring that commercial actors are not effectively 'judgment proof' for the consequences of obligations they
voluntarily assume in other states ...."142
The evolution of a flexible due process analysis applied to foreign corporations turns on the recognition that the global marketplace transcends state borders. The New Jersey Supreme Court has
commented:
[F]oreign manufacturers derive benefits from the indirect sale
of their products throughout the United States. By increasing
the distribution of its products, the manufacturer not only
benefits economically from indirect sales to forum residents,
but also benefits from the protection provided by the laws of
the forum state .... A foreign manufacturer that purposefully

avails itself of those benefits should be subject to personal jurisdiction, even though its products are distributed by independent companies or by an independent, but whollyowned, subsidiary.4 3
While companies that engage in international commerce derive
38

Id. at 422-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Id. at 423 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 413-14.
41 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
42 Id. at 486 (citing McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223
(1957)).
39

40

43 Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equip. Corp., 102 N.J. 460, 478-79,
508 A.2d 1127, 1136-37 (1986).
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benefits from those states in which their products are distributed,
the Due Process Clause has traditionally restricted the exercise of
state court jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The demands of
international commerce, however, compel a flexible approach to
due process considerations, for it would be unfair to allow a foreign
corporation to reap economic benefits in a state without holding the
corporation accountable for its commercial conduct. As the marketplace becomes increasingly internationalized, the Constitution affords ever more leeway to states for the expansion of their
jurisdiction over commercial activity.
2.

The Attempt To Internationalize Due Process of Law

Though foreign corporations may be amenable to suit in
state courts, the Hague Convention has internationalized due
process of law by requiring that court papers be translated and
served on a central authority.4 4 As a multinational treaty formulated in 1964, the Hague Convention has been acceded to or ratified by thirty-two countries.4 5 The Hague Convention was
intended to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to
assure that foreign defendants would receive actual notice of a
lawsuit and to facilitate proof of service abroad. 46 In Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,4 7 the seminal interpretation of the
treaty, the Supreme Court held that where service on a domestic
agent is invalid under state law and the Due Process Clause, service must be made pursuant to the Hague Convention.4" The
Court declared:
The legal sufficiency of a formal delivery of documents must
be measured against some standard. The [Hague] Convention
does not prescribe a standard, so we almost necessarily must
refer to the internal law of the forum state. If the internal law
of the forum state defines the applicable method of serving
process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad,
then the Hague Convention applies.4"
As previously observed, New Jersey courts are vested with jurisdiction over foreign corporations to the outer limits of due process
44

Convention on the Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents in

Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361.
45
46

See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 698 (1988).
Id. at 698-99.

47 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
48
49

Id. at 707.
Id. at 700.
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of law. 50 While service abroad would probably require translating
documents and serving a central authority in a foreign country, 5' a
foreign corporation's subsidiary may be located in the forum state.
It is uncertain whether service of process upon a domestic subsidiary of a foreign corporation complies with due process of law.
The issue of whether a forum state may exercise jurisdiction
over a parent corporation based on the forum contacts of its subsidiary originally arose over sixty years ago in Cannon Manufacturing Co.
v. Cudahy Packing Co. 52 In this 1925 case, the Supreme Court discussed whether a carefully maintained corporate separation between
parent and subsidiary must be ignored in assessing the existence of
jurisdiction. Declining to base jurisdiction over the parent on the
basis of the subsidiary's forum contacts, the Court noted that the
use of a subsidiary does not necessarily subject a parent corporation
to the jurisdiction of the forum state in which the subsidiary does
business. 4 The Cannon Manufacturing Court further explained:
The corporate separation, though perhaps merely formal, was
real. It was not pure fiction. There is here no attempt to hold
the defendant [parent] liable for an act or omission of its subsidiary or 55to enforce as against the latter a liability of the
defendant.
The reasoning in Cannon Manufacturing suggests that a subsidiary's forum contacts may be imputed to its parent only upon piercing the subsidiary's corporate veil. As New Jersey courts have
recognized, however, "at the time Cannon was decided ...the applicable test of whether a foreign corporation was subject to in personam
jurisdiction was the test of presence within the jurisdiction. "56
Presently, under New Jersey law, serving a foreign parent
through a domestic subsidiary when they are separate and distinct
entities violates due process of law. 5 7 The Hague Convention must
be used unless the subsidiary's corporate form can be pierced to
reach the parent. While service of process implicates the Due Pro50

See Avdel Corp. v. Mecure, 58 N.J. 264, 268, 277 A.2d 207, 209 (1971).

51 See Cintron v. W & D Mach. Co., 182 N.J. Super. 126, 128 n.1, 440 A.2d 76,

77 n. 1 (Law Div. 1981) (noting that the Hague Convention calls for a "central authority" in each country to accept foreign service requests).
52 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
53
54
55
56

Id. at 336.
Id.

Id. at 337.

Taca Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 84 N.J. Super. 140, 146, 201
A.2d 97, 100 (Law Div. 1964).
57 Gapanovich v. Komori Corp., 255 NJ. Super. 607, 605 A.2d 1120 (App. Div.
1992).
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cess Clause,5" the relevancy of the corporate form seems diminished
when the foreign parent has already availed itself of the benefits of
the forum state through its domestic subsidiary. The availment of
commercial benefits within a particular forum presumably creates
the expectation that the foreign parent is amenable to suit in that
forum. The requirement of translating documents for service
abroad appears unnecessary when the domestic subsidiary has been
utilized to benefit the foreign parent. Arguably, it would be consistent with due process of law to treat the domestic subsidiary as the
foreign parent's agent for service of process, irrespective of whether
it acts as the parent's alter-ego. In any event, under New Jersey law
the Hague Convention must be utilized for service of process when
the domestic subsidiary maintains a separate and distinct corporate
identity from that of its foreign parent.
Because the minimum contacts analysis 5" has long since replaced the actual presence requirement, courts have determined
that a clear distinction must be drawn between liability and jurisdictional concepts when considering whether to pierce the corporate
veil. 60 To the extent that Cannon Manufacturing suggests that substantive piercing standards control jurisdictional analysis, some New
Jersey courts 6 ' have adopted the standard set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws which provides:
If the subsidiary corporation does an act, or causes effects, in
the state at the direction of the parent corporation or in the
course of the parent corporation's business, the state has judicial jurisdiction over the parent to the same extent that it
would have had such jurisdiction if the parent had itself done
the act or caused the effects.
Judicial jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation will likewise
give the state judicial jurisdiction over the parent corporation
if the parent so controls and dominates the subsidiary as in
58 Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphee, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1945).
59 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
60 See generally McPheron v. Penn Central Trans. Co., 390 F. Supp. 943, 953 (D.

Conn. 1975).

61 See Moon Carrier v. Reliance Ins. Co., 153 N.J. Super. 312, 323, 379 A.2d

517, 523 (Law Div. 1977) (applying the Restatement's standard to find that a close
relationship between a parent corporation, AT&T, and its wholly-owned subsidiary, New York Telephone Company, alone was insufficient to bring nonresident
subsidiary within state court's jurisdiction); Unicon Invs. v. Fisco, Inc., 137 N.J.

Super. 395, 401-02, 349 A.2d 117, 121 (Law Div. 1975) (holding that a subsidiary
engaging in business in New Jersey and its parent company's high expectations for
subsidiary's profits from New Jersey business did not subject parent corporation to
New Jersey jurisdiction as guarantor of subsidiary's lease of New Jersey property).
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In Taca Int'l Airlines, Inc. v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd. ,63 an action for property damage to aircraft, the plaintiff sued a Delaware subsidiary,
which had done business in New Jersey, its Canadian sister corporation and its English parent corporation. The latter two corporations
had no independent New Jersey contacts whatsoever; consequently,
relying on Cannon Manufacturing, they moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff opposed the motion by arguing
that the subsidiary's operations were so interwoven with those of its
foreign parent that its forum contacts should be imputed to the
parent.
The court denied the motion. After finding that the subsidiary
was "an integral part of the [parent's] economic empire" comprising one cohesive economic unit, the court held that the foreign corporation's ties with the domestic subsidiary constituted sufficient
minimum contacts with New Jersey.'
In Cintron v. W &D Machinery Co. ,65 however, a NewJersey court
found that service of process upon a wholly owned domestic subsidiary was ineffective with regard to its West German parent, in view
of the plaintiffs' failure to establish that an officer, director, trustee,
managing agent or general agent had been authorized to accept service of process in New Jersey. The court reasoned that service can
be effected upon the parent through the subsidiary consistent with
due process of law only where the subsidiary is a "mere instrumentality" of a parent, as measured by the similarity of officers and directors, the commonality of financial arrangement and the level of
control. 6 6 Accordingly, the Cintron court held that due process mandated that service of process be made pursuant to the Hague
Convention.
At least with regard to the mass distribution of products by foreign corporations, the New Jersey Supreme Court has entirely disregarded the corporate veil analysis. In Charles Gendler & Co. v. Telecom
Equipment Corp. ,67 the Supreme Court held that "[a] foreign manufacturer that purposefully avails itself of ... benefits [in NewJersey]
should be subject to personal jurisdiction, even though its products
are distributed by independent companies or by an independent,
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 52
63 84 N.J. Super. 140, 201 A.2d 97 (Law Div. 1964).
64 Id. at 148, 149, 201 A.2d at 101.
65 182 N.J. Super. 126, 440 A.2d 76 (Law Div. 1981).
66 Id. at 131-33, 440 A.2d at 79-80.
67 102 N.J. 460, 508 A.2d 1127 (1986).

cmt. (b) (1971).
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but wholly-owned subsidiary."68 In expanding the jurisdiction of
the New Jersey courts, the Charles Gendler court recognized that it
would be unfair for foreign corporations to insulate themselves
while they derived benefits from a global marketplace. 6 9
The Charles Gendler court adopted the United States Supreme
Court's "purposeful availment" test first articulated in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 7 ° In Burger King, the defendant, a Michigan resident, negotiated a franchise agreement with a Florida corporation
and, in so doing, used the mails. He never stepped foot in Florida.
The Court found, however, that a Florida court had jurisdiction
over the defendant because he had purposefully derived a benefit
from Florida by negotiating with a corporation formed under the
state's laws. The Court based its conclusion on the premise that
"the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial
shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily
assumed.

' 7'

Although the New Jersey Supreme Court has expanded state
court jurisdiction over foreign corporations that distribute products
to New Jersey through middlemen, the Charles Gendler reasoning
could very well be applied to the negotiation of a contract through a
domestic subsidiary. Thus, a foreign parent lacking contacts with
New Jersey but deriving a benefit from a contract negotiated by a
domestic subsidiary with a New Jersey corporation may be haled
into a New Jersey court. Under this elastic approach, it is difficult to
imagine how the Due Process Clause would continue to act as a restriction on state sovereignty under this scenario. Due to the demands of a national economy, however, minimum contacts is
replacing actual presence as a basis for personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the international marketplace demands a much more
elastic approach to personal jurisdiction. The minimum contacts requirement seems outmoded in the age of multinational combinations doing business in the global marketplace.
Ironically, the federalism envisioned by Madison and Hamilton
has allowed the state courts to define the contours of the Due Process Clause: "As courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal district
courts possess no warrant to create jurisdictional law of their
own.... [T]hey must apply state law 'except where the Constitution
68

Id. at 478-79, 508 A.2d at 1137.

69 Id. at 479, 508 A.2d at 1137.
70 Id. at 470, 508 A.2d at 1132 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.

462, 471-72 (1985)).
71 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
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or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide .... , ",72 NewJersey courts may exercise their jurisdiction worldwide, irrespective of treaties that seek to
internationalize due process of law. 73 The global marketplace has
truly expanded the power of the states to impose their jurisdictional
law on international commerce. Although the Due Process Clause
may no longer provide a realistic limit on state power, fundamental
fairness and convenience to litigants still constitute important
considerations.
3.

The Inconvenient Forum

The doctrine offorum non conveniens permits a court to deny
hearing a case despite the existence of jurisdiction in the interests of the litigants and in the interest of justice. 4 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has asserted:
The primary danger against which the doctrine guards is the
plaintiff's "temptation to resort to a strategy of forcing the
trial at a most inconvenient place for an adversary, even at
some inconvenience to himself," so that he can "'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him expense
or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his
75
remedy."
Of paramount concern inforum non conveniens analysis is whether
72 Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
U.S. 694, 711 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1992)).
73 While the supremacy of a treaty has been "recognized from the beginning,"
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937), it is clear, at least in New
Jersey, that the Hague Convention's requirement to translate pleadings and serve
them in a foreign country does not limit a litigant's ability to circumvent the convention by serving a domestic corporation irrespective of whether the domestic corporation is located in NewJersey or elsewhere. Indeed, the Third Circuit has noted
that the Hague Convention does not affect a state's chosen limits on the jurisdictional reach of its courts. Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280,
288-89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981). On the other hand, at least one
United States District Court has held that the nature of the alter ego analysis used in
determining diversity jurisdiction renders it inappropriate for use in the context of
the Warsaw Convention. See In re Air Disaster Near Cove Neck, N.Y. on Jan. 25,
1990, 774 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
74 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504-05, 507 (1947) (tracing the
origin, development and application of forum non conveniens, and noting that the
principle empowers courts '.with a discretion to change the place of a trial on various grounds, such as the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice.").
75 Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 615 (3d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947)); see also Mediterrean
Golf, Inc. v. Hirsh, 783 F. Supp. 835, 852-53 (D.N.J. 1991) ("The doctrine offorum
non conveniens is 'grounded in concern for the costs that must be expended in litigation and the convenience of the parties.' ") (quoting Lony, 935 F.2d at 614).
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"trial in the chosen forum would 'establish . . .oppressiveness and
vexation to a defendant.., out of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience,' or [whether] the 'chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and
legal problems.' ",76 A court's initial inquiry in deciding to dismiss a
complaint on forum non conveniens grounds is whether there is an adequate alternate forum to hear the case. 7
If such a forum exists, a court must consider the various factors
set forth by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert.78 These
factors fall into two broad categories. One category includes factors
relating to the "private interests" of the parties in the context of the
litigation: the plaintiff's choice of forum, the ease of accessibility to
sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process over unwilling witnesses, the cost of attendance by willing witnesses, the obstacles to a fair trial and the possibility of a jury view of the premises. 79
The other category consists of the "public interest" in the administration of courts and the adjudication of cases: court congestion and
other administrative difficulties, placing the burden of jury duty on
those having the closet ties to the action, local interest in having the
case adjudicated at home and the forum court's familiarity with the
applicable law.80
Thus, even if a court has jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, it may not choose to exercise it. While the Due Process Clause
has been pushed to its outer limits, courts may decline to hear cases
if the plaintiff's choice of forum unduly burdens the foreign defendant. While the Constitution has allowed courts to exercise worldwide jurisdiction, courts may use their discretion to limit the
burdens on foreign commerce or give effect to the parties' choice of
forum.
III.
A.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

InternationalArbitration

As international trade and commerce develop, political and
economic concerns increase the need for prompt and efficient
resolutions of business disputes. 8 ' Arbitration is rapidly becom76 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981), reh'g denied, 455 U.S.
928 (1982) (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524
(1947)).
77 Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 862 F.2d 38, 43 (3d Cir. 1988).
78 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947).
79 Id. at 508.
80 Id.at 508-09.
81 Christine Lecuyer-Thieffry and Patrick Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Dispute
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ing a viable alternative to litigation, which can be expensive and
time consuming.8 2 Agreements to arbitrate contained in contracts that involve international commerce are governed by federal law.8 3
Many countries are parties to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("the Arbitration Convention").14 The Federal Arbitration Act 8 5 implemented the United States' accession to the Arbitration
Convention.8 6 In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. ,87 the Supreme Court
observed that:
[t]he goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial
arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify
the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed
and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries. 88
Indeed, the Scherk Court maintained that "[a] contractual provision
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated
...
is ... an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of
the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction."-8 9
The Federal Arbitration Act "reflects a legislative determination of the desirability of arbitration as an alternative to litigation" 90
and, correspondingly, the federal courts have promoted a liberal
policy of favoring arbitration. 9 ' Moreover, "there is nothing discreProvisionsin InternationalBusiness Contracts: Recent Developments in Arbitrationand Other
Processes, 45 Bus. LAw 577 (1990).
82 Id.
83 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984).
84 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
85
86
87

9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1988).
Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1983).

417 U.S. 506 (1974).

88 Id. at 520, n. 15.
89 Id. at 516. In recognizing the essential nature of international arbitration, the
Supreme Court has observed:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in
our courts.... We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets
and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our
laws, and resolved in our courts.
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
90 Singer Co. v. Tappan Co., 403 F. Supp. 322, 329 (D.N.J. 1975), aff'd, 544
F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1976).
91 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) ("'In enacting ... the federal
Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
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tionary about... the [Arbitration] Convention. It states that district
courts shall at the request of a party to an arbitration agreement refer the parties to arbitration." '9 2 The Third Circuit has held that the
Arbitration Act's policy is best effectuated by an approach that leads
to upholding arbitration agreements.93 Even violations of federal
statutes have been ordered to arbitration.9 4
Like domestic arbitration, international arbitration results in a
binding decision by a neutral third party. It differs from litigation,
however, because the parties agree in advance on the forum and
may themselves structure the arbitral process. 9 5 International arbitration continues to develop as an attractive alternative to global
litigation.
B.

Conciliation

In addition to arbitration, conciliation is gaining currency as
an effective alternative to international litigation.9 6 The concept
of conciliation resembles arbitration, with both methods using a
third party to resolve a dispute. The primary feature of conciliation, however, is that a conciliator recommends an outcome. 97
The recommendation does not bind the parties, although a settlement agreement made between the parties based on the conciliator's recommendations is binding on the parties. 98
Promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC), 9 the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration (the Rules) apply to international business contracts if the parties so agree in
advance. The party requesting conciliation must apply to the
Secretariat of the ICC's International Court of Arbitration who
appoints a conciliator.' 0 0 The conciliator is then granted broad
power to "conduct the conciliation process as he thinks fit,
power of the states to require ajudicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.' ") (quoting Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)).
92 McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.P.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir.
1974).
93 Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53-54 (3d Cir. 1983).
94 See generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
95 See generally Linda C. Reif, ConciliationAs a Mechanism For the Resolution Of InternationalEconomic and Business Disputes, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 578 (1991).
96 Id. at 611.
97 Id. at 586.
98 Id.
99 ICC Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration, Rules of Optional Conciliation
(1990).
100 Id. at art. 2 and 4.
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guided by the principles of impartiality, equity and justice." ' If
the parties sign a settlement agreement, the Rules provide that it
is binding upon them and that the agreement's terms are confi10 2
dential unless the parties agree otherwise.
C.

ForeignJudgments

While a party to the Arbitration Convention, under which
arbitration awards can be enforced easily, the United States is not
a party to any treaty concerning the recognition of foreign court
judgments. To enforce a foreign judgment, a domestic party
must initiate a separate proceeding in the United States. Similar
to the determination of jurisdiction, the determination of
whether a judgment should be given conclusive effect in the
10 3
United States is governed by state law.
In New Jersey, whether a foreign judgment is entitled to enforcement depends upon whether New Jersey courts will recognize the judgment under the doctrine of comity. Decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 1985, Hilton v. Guyot 104 remains
the leading case on comity. The Hilton Court explained that:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws. 105
Furthermore, the Hilton Court stated that judgments of foreign
countries constitute only prima facie, not conclusive, evidence of the
plaintiff's claim:
[J]udgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country, by the laws of which our own judgments are reviewable
upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and conclusive
effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evi10 6
dence only of the justice of the plaintiff's claim.
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 6 and 7.
Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir.
1971).
104 159 U.S. 113 (1985).
105 Id. at 163-64.
106 Id. at 227. The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the Hilton definition of
comity in Fantony v. Fantony, 21 NJ. 525, 533, 122 A.2d 593, 596 (1956).
101
102
103
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Thus, even if a domestic corporation undertook the effort to sue a
foreign corporation in a foreign forum and prevailed by obtaining a
judgment, the judgment may not be enforceable in the United
States. On this basis alone, use of the Arbitration Convention, with
its predictability of enforcement, comprises an attractive alternative
to global litigation.
IV.

TOWARD A UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

While alternate methods of dispute resolution can provide
for some degree of predictability in international commercial
transactions, the question of which law, foreign or domestic, governs the resolution of a dispute may result in extensive litigation.
New Jersey courts 10 7 have adopted the "governmental interest
approach" to choice of law questions:
This approach requires a two-step analysis. The court determines first the governmental policies evidenced by the laws of
each related jurisdiction and second the factual contacts between the parties and each related jurisdiction. A state is
deemed interested only where application10 8of its law to the
facts in issue will foster that state's policy.
Thus, while holding the power to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that has had no direct contact with the state, a New
Jersey court may be compelled to apply foreign law because the nation in which the foreign corporation resides may have a greater interest in the outcome of the dispute. Applying foreign law to the
resolution of a commercial dispute may undermine the purpose of
filing suit in a domestic forum, particularly where foreign law limits
legal remedies.
To avoid the unpredictability and confusion of a wide variety of
foreign legal systems, thirty-six countries, including the United
States, have acceded to the United Nations Convention on Con09
tracts for the International Sale of Goods (the Sales Convention).1
The Sales Convention provides substantive provisions of law for
governing the formation of international sales contracts as well as
the rights and obligations of buyers and sellers.' 1° The Sales Convention applies to all contracts for the sale of goods between parties
107 See, e.g., Henry v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 508 F.2d 28, 31-32 (3d Cir. 1975)
(noting that New Jersey courts first adopted the "governmental interest approach"
in Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967) and Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Company, 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129 (1970)).
108 Id. at 32.
109 15 U.S.C. app. (1992).
11o Id. at Public Notice 1004.
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with their places of business located in the signatory countries,
"provided the parties have left their contracts silent as to applicable
11
law."
As noted by Secretary of State George P. Shultz in his Letter of
Submittal accompanying the Convention in its presentation to President Ronald Reagan:
The usefulness of the Convention is enhanced by the fact that
its rules were specially fashioned to meet the problems and
needs of international trade. Our sellers and buyers now must
cope with foreign statutes and code[s] that were prepared a
century or more ago, and were designed for domestic sales
that bear little resemblance to current international transactions. Even when these problems have been ameliorated by
case-law, such developments are often unknown or inaccessible to our lawyers." 2
In short, the Sales Convention unifies the law of international
sales, as the Uniform Commercial Code's Article 2 unifies the law of
domestic sales. Such uniformity can only enhance international
commerce because it allows parties to factor out the uncertainties of
foreign law.
V.

CONCLUSION

The global marketplace is changing the way people do business in New Jersey. With increasing markets comes the increasing possibility of commercial disputes. While litigation may be
expensive and time consuming, it nevertheless remains a primary
method of dispute resolution. The imperatives of the global
marketplace have required courts to expand their jurisdiction
over international commerce. Once a bulwark for protecting a
person's liberty interest in not being unfairly haled into a distant
forum, the Due Process Clause has all but become an illusory
limitation on state power. Moreover, by increasing their jurisdiction over foreign parties and by applying a uniform international
law, domestic courts are evolving into international tribunals.
As due process protections have diminished, and as litigation costs have become increasingly burdensome, parties have
adapted and are exercising their freedom to contract by choosing
alternative methods to resolve their commercial disputes. It is
clear that as a consequence of increasing state power over com'''1 Id.
112 Id. at Message Accompanying Transmittal, Letter of Submittal from Secretary
of State George P. Shultz to President Ronald Reagan (Aug. 30, 1983).
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merce and the escalating costs of pursuing traditional legal remedies, individuals have found, and continue to develop, new ways
to express their freedom to conduct business and to resolve their
differences in the global marketplace.

